Techtextil North America wrapped up last week in Atlanta, GA. It was the largest textile show I’ve ever been to in the US. Technical textiles are a big industry; some $126 Bn in 2011 sales according to IFAI. The industry is large and participants are always searching for new markets, applications and technologies to improve their business’s performance. Demand for new information and education is strong.
Setting up for Techtextil 2012 in Atlanta, GA.
Unfortunately the supply of new information and education opportunities; in the form of trade shows is equally strong. Too strong. There are many, many trade shows. Far too many for any one group to possibly attend them all, and unfortunately, this problem causes a downward spiral. The quality of the shows suffer, as the industry doesn’t have enough new material to supply them all with new and unique data. This leads some shows to put forward sub-par information, further degrading the quality of what they are putting forward. However, since the shows are individually unsatisfying, it forces those in the industry to continue to go to new shows trying to interpret what they are hearing.
In the area where I spend the most of my time; nonwovens and filtration, in the US alone we have INDA (disclaimer that I am on INDA’s Board of Directors), TAPPI and AFS. That is before we get to more equipment focused organizations or groups like NAMS which focus on membranes – and there isn’t enough space here to cover all of the outstanding university programs with their own proliferation of education opportunities. Each of these individual groups has multiple sub-groups, and from these sub-groups spring trade shows and conferences galore. I realize these groups have their own areas of focus; INDA on industry and trade issues; TAPPI with its focus on individual professional development and AFS and NAMS with their focus on the technical challenges and advances in filtration and separation.
Trade shows and conferences are how these groups make money; which is where we get to the Prisoner’s Dilemma problem. The industry should have fewer shows and conferences. These groups need to consolidate. This proliferation of events, while good for the individual organizations, hurts the industry and makes the cost of staying in front of technical issues too high for individual firms. (Perhaps this makes this exploitation of the industry a Tragedy of the Commons.)
Individually, each of these shows and conferences make sense. Collectively they are impossible to navigate from a tech scouting, selling, strategy, or marketing standpoint.
Posted inBusiness, Industry, Textile|Comments Off on The Prisoner’s Dilemma of Textile Trade Shows
I’ve been using several geo-based Apps on an iPhone 4S and trying to think through how they could be made more useful in traditional sales and marketing areas. I manage a team that sells high end industrial machinery to traditional businesses that are not heavy users of Twitter, FB, G+ or other conventional social media applications. Personally, I use Google Latitude to share location with family and serve as memory-recall to help remember where I was. 4Square is useful for seeing if friends or contacts are nearby and getting recommendations when traveling; it suffers from a narrower contact list than would be desired in a commercial setting.
Apps I’ve I’ve looked at:
Google Latitude and Foursquare have value; Sonar has a *lot* of potential.
Google Latitude (“GL” or Latitude): This is Google’s location based product. It tracks where you are at all times and allows some version of that to be shared (either to the public, G+ users or select friends). I use it to share my location at all times with my close family. Sharing is set up to be 100% reciprocal, however, it can be modified.
Four Square (“4s”): This is an independent software vendor that provides a downloadable app for the iPhone that allows easy sharing via Facebook or Twitter. 4Square allows you to share one-time usage and location information whenever you check-in (Latitude allows the same check-in capability). You can friend users on 4Square and sharing here is also reciprocal.
Facebook. Facebook has a geographic sharing capability as part of its posts that lets you identify near by friends as well as your current location. Facebook has the benefit (for me) of being where I have most of my contacts (other than LinkedIn).
Sonar. Sonar is an app that follows your Twitter followers, LinkedIn contacts and Facebook friends. It will tell you who is nearby when you are in a location, as well as second-degree contacts; friends-of-friends. It is a newer app, but has some real potential.
Garmin. This is the iOS app version of a traditional Garmin GPS unit. If you’ve used one of their products, then you would instinctively know how to use this unit. It is a good product and has the software of a high-end unit. This allows tracking of past locations and does a good job of pulling in your iPhone contacts.
Others (Find-my-friends) and Google Maps. Find-my-Friends is Apple’s iDevice-iDevice location sharing app. Nothing fancy, and it’s universe of potential users is the smallest, making it not terribly useful. Google Maps is the built-in mapping device installed on the iDevices; it serves as the base material for all Google mapping apps. It has no social component.
Most common and useful features:
Location awareness and frequency
Persistence
Single Instance
Location Tracking
Latitude has this as does the Garmin for iPhone app. This allows you to see where you were, when driving, etc. in the past.
This is accessed by the use of a ‘Check-in’ and is possible on both 4Square and Latitude, although 4s’s location library (below) is much larger).
Location Sharing
Latitude allows you to share with others where it thinks you are (or where you are telling it you are) at all times. Apple’s FMF also allows this.
Only check-ins are allowed to be shared. Others can see when you most recently completed this activity.
Contact list: Latitude does a good job of encouraging you to share with others and showing other Latitude users; it is easy to see how this will fit into G+’s long term ambitions and I expect it will be promoted more over the coming years. 4Square can be given access to Facebook, which is useful, as well as other traditional sources of contact library. Here, FB actually has a real advantage. My list of friends on FB is the largest, however they are much less frequent users of geographic services.
Geography on Facebook: Lots of Contacts, Few Check-ins
Monetization. I’ve never received any kind of compensation for using Google Latitude. I know they promote coupons, etc., but it has never happened. I estimate that in a few months of use, I’ve received about ~$60 in value from discounts (237 check-ins, so $0.25 approximate value), free goods and Amex points from using 4Square. No question which has been more valuable here.
Google Latitude and Foursquare had similar commercial location libraries; Foursquare's recommendations were more valuable.
Location library – count and types: Latitude only allows you to check in to ‘Google Approved Locations.’ If you’ve used Google Maps any or done similar advertising, you can own a location and promote it via that system. Google starts with this as its framework for Location curation. 4Square and FB, on the other hand, allow locations to be created by users. On 4Square it is common to see historical sites, residences, etc. Google starts with an orientation of selling to a business, the others start with what would be interesting to an individual (business owner or not).
Location library – information and detail. A Latitude location is more likely to have a rating (Google Maps’ 5-star system), address and contact information, however most commercial entities for 4Square also have all of this detail. This is a generalization, but I tend to find the 4Square commentary more valuable, as it is much more probable that the people have visited the actual location. Many of the Latitude rec’s come from Google Maps data.
Example of Google Latitude's Dashboard (Like everything from Google, it is in Beta).
Dashboard. Google’s Dashboard is good for a professional user who wants to track their location history (this fits me very well). 4Square is more focused on showing what badges you have unlocked and what your fictitious score is.
API / Widgets: I’m not a developer and can’t give a refined argument one way or the other here.
Foursquare promotes usage through badges, points, etc.
Game-i-fication. 4Square gives you points for doing all kinds of things; they attempt to encourage use of their method and benchmark you against your friend-list. Google has tried to do similar with its rating of how well you know a place. Check in a few times and move from visitor to regular. Continue to check and become a guru of a location (no single mayors like 4Square).
Creepiness. 4Square has worked to make itself socially acceptable, although several of my friends in the SE US still tell me that it should not be used as it will allow people to know I am out and break into my home. Fair enough. If you show anyone Google Latitude they will immediately remark, “That is creepy.” There is no way around it. I like that my family can immediately know where I am and vice-versa; that does come with some creepiness penalty. (I would be interested to know how many people actually use the Latitude badges to put that out in the public domain on a website – my bet is not many.)
Use methods. Latitude is good as a form of memory augmentation for those who travel a lot or for those who value precision in remembering where they were. 4Square is good for staying in touch with friends and it has a useful social recommendation engine which has proved valuable.
Posted inUncategorized|Comments Off on Geography & Location-Based Apps: A Sales Perspective
Below is the transcript from my TEDx Raleigh deck – in putting it together I noticed some mistakes, which are noted. I had walked through four intro slides that were a play on “Making Sexy Textiles” that was not caught on the video. Thank you again for all of the feedback.
[Start with outline slide.]
So we’re going to cover, where were we with textiles in the past? Where are we now? And, where are we heading next?
Next slide. [Eve and the Apple.]
And in the beginning we had no textiles, we had nudity. If you look at every classical origin story and definition in religion there are no clothes.
Next. [Cave men.]
And what we see is that clothes come, and in that 40,000 BCE you start to see the use of needle and thread to create fashion, to create apparel.
As we start to look at other areas of textiles, let’s look at the application of those materials – and we see in 3,200 BCE, we start to see sails emerge in the hieroglyphics of Egypt. And they are using a Lateen rig, a very simple rig.
[Slide change to Weaving – 2,000 BCE.]
Around 2,000 we see weaving starts to spread, and the loom starts to appear in all of the archaeology both in images, and also the evidence of it in the materials that are being produced.
[Slide change: 1,300 BCE – 1300 AD Nefertiti / King Edward / Chinese Silk]
Between 1300 BCE and 1300 AD you see things like Nefertiti, again, the feedback loop between where she was and what she’s wearing. She’s got on linen. You see King Edward in his gaudy ostentatious material displaying his wealth.
And then, on the far left, you’ve got China and they’ve domesticated an insect, the silkworm, to make a new material. To harvest that silk they created a new weave, and then they put that into new and novel applications where that stronger thread made for stronger material.
[2:15 / Next slide – 1500 AD Caravel.]
Let’s go back to transportation. If we look at that Lateen rig, if we put on a second sail, we put thirty to forty people on it, and now we have a caravel.
Well, why would we care about a caravel? It’s because that is what the Portugeuse use to begin the Age of Exploration. These ships were driven around the world by the power of cloth through the sail.
[2:41 / Next slide – Bermuda Rig 1700 AD.]
That invention and trend continues with the Bermuda rig, which was developed in the Caribbean around 1700. Here we have bigger ships transporting things around the world, all driven by textiles.
[2:53 / Next slide – 1784: Carding and Nonwovens.]
In 1784 we see another divergence in how textiles are made with the advent of a method called carding. This is the first nonwoven. Beforehand, everytime we made a fiber, we made it into a yarn. With carding, that stops. You get different materials that you can work with, you get different applications that can be used in.
[3:16 / Next slide – 1784: Cartwright’s Powered Loom]
In 1784 we see Cartwright in England developed the powered loom. Now, what’s interesting about this, is that this was a commercial failure. For 47 years, until the Lancaster loom was invented, because for every one powered loom of Cartwright’s model, you needed one operator. The powered loom does not take off for 47 years until you can have one operator and more looms, so you get rid of labor. As we talk and continue, we’ll flash back and that “getting rid of labor” is a thing we’ll see persist throughout the history of textiles.
[3:52 / 1789: Hamilton’s Report on Manufacturers]
Now, every time we read about some country looking to undermine an industrial manufacturing base here in the US by going after an industry we have one person to blame. Unfortunately, that person is a founding father. Hamilton’s report on manufacturers in 1789 laid out the US industrial strategy for the next two centuries. He sent industrial spies to England to look at mills, to understand what they were, and to bring that technology back to the U.S. So here, when you think about the application of textiles, he was applying it to a whole new society – to a whole new way of looking at the world in order to fund this nascent democracy.
[4:36 / 1793: Eli Whitney and the Cotton Gin]
In 1793 Eli Whitney comes along with the cotton gin. Before this, people worked with cotton, but you couldn’t work with that much of it because it was too expensive. It was too labor intense to [properly] harvest cotton. So, you create a new material out of which to make the textiles and in so doing you change the agricultural base. You change the demographics and you change the agricultural scene of the Southeast United States.
[5:01 / 1804: Jacquard Loom]
In 1804 the Jacquard loom comes around. This is the first piece of equipment that uses punch cards. So if anyone is familiar with the computer industry and IBM punch cards, and the use of Hollerith cards, this all stems from Jacquard’s pioneering use of this material to store data, to store a pattern, and to use it [punch cards] as human-machine interface.
And just so you understand the lasting impact of that [the invention of punch cards] – there are two brands on this page. eBay, again just less than a decade old and a 206 year old Jacquard loom. His brand, but a modern creation, that any of us could go buy today.
[5:43 / 1814: Francis Cabot Lowell]
1814, Francis Cabot Lowell returns [to the US] at the age of 36. He’d gone to England, following Hamilton’s vision and brings back a textbook application of how I’m going to take these textiles and grow a manufacturing base here in the US.
[5:59 / 1881: Chain Stitch]
In 1881, the third of the three major stitches, the Overlock Stitch, building on the lock stitch and the chain stitch, is pioneered by a company by the name of the Merrow Manufacturing Company in Connecticutt, which still operates to this day. This is the stitch you see at the edge. For every one inch of edge, you can have as much as twenty-two inches of yarn to seal it and give it the properties you want to have.
Now, what’s interesting is that Merrow continues to be the leader in this technology until the 1960’s, when a Japanese company by the name of Juki comes along and starts to pioneer an improvement on this, on the overlock stitch. One of their [Juki’s] first international offices is 15 miles from here in the Research Triangle Park.
[6:46 / 1935: Nylon]
Nylon is one of the biggest inventions when it comes to textiles, and probably one of the most important inventions if you look at the history of innovation. What’s fascinating about this is that it’s our [mankind’s] first opportunity to create a synthetic material and what we did with it was make a fiber. We could have done anything with it – you could make a toothbrush, people made toothbrush bristles, and you can think of all the things we make today that you make out of a plastic. The first thing that we did was make a fiber.
[7:15 / 1969 Gerber]
The Gerber automatic cutting company, and this I my last slide on our whirlwind tour, it is now 1969 pioneers a method for automatic cutting. This is decades before robots would be used to help build a car. So before robots made cars, they happened to make textiles. They even made, for one reason or another, this was mostly used in undergarments – so the robots were making sexy textiles.
[7:44 / Agenda Slide]
[7:45 / Policy Slide]
So, where are we now? And to understand where we are now in the textile industry starts with an understanding of public policy. Tariffs and trade agreements around textiles go back far beyond what we have on this list here. They all guide us to the 1994 Agreement on Textiles and Clothing and then getting us to 2004 when the quotas are abolished.
We all know what happens next to us here in North Carolina.
[8:10 / Gary Gereffi, Duke University excerpts from “Industrial Adjustment in the North Carolina Textile and Clothing Industry”]
The two graphs on the top, the red and the blue, are textile and apparel related jobs, and you see how they immediately fall off once the tariffs are lifted. Across the bottom, we see the impact as jobs are lost across the state of North Carolina. While we see that it is disappointing that we lose the fashion and the apparel, there is another line here that never goes down. It stays use.
That is the use of technical textiles. We lost the fashion jobs. We lost the mills that sold into fashion, but we kept the materials that are sold into items like battery separators, like high end filtration for pharmaceutical s processing. Those did not leave. We as a state, remain a leader in that industry.
[9:18 / Manufacturing as GDP]
Following up on the broader national trend, you see the green of manufacturing jobs tail off, and it decreases more and more in every recession. The red and the blue, of manufacturing output, continue to rise.
[9:24 / Weaving Productivity]
As we understand, why is that? [Why do jobs fall, but productivity rises?] Productivity continues to rise – let’s just look at this shirt I’ve got on. In 1975 it would’ve taken 13 minutes of time on a loom to make this shirt. Today it takes three.
[9:39 / Textile Productivity]
As you look at what that impact means – a great quote from a fantastic book if you want to learn more on this industry, is that while “textile production has increased three-fold, the number of workers has been reduced by more than half. “ A Stitch In Time
We spend too much time as North Carolinians focused on the second half of this phrase. We spend too much time thinking about all the things that we’ve lost and not looking at that 3x improvement in productivity that we’ve gained. Think about what that would mean in so many of the industries that we work with.
[10:10 / NCSU College of Textiles]
Where does that productivity gain come from? It comes from research done here in our own state. The College of Textiles at NC State University is a one of a kind global institution. Every year you’ve got 200 people, about 150 undergrads, 50 grad students, from all over the world matriculating through that program.
This is a one of a kind institution.
If you are a small cut and sew operation in rural Southeast Asia, and you’re going to make one international trip in 2011, you are going to come to an event at the NC State College of Textiles. If you’re a small business in Central Europe, and you want to figure out where your second office should be, you’re going to hire a rep, or you’re going to come to Raleigh, or Charlotte to open that next business. [This is] Especially [true] if you’re selling into an industrial, or technical textile, supply chain.
[11:05 / Agenda – The Future, The Shock of the Old]
We’ve talked a little about where we were, where we began, and let’s take a bit of a peak into the future and see where we’re going with textiles, and why this is an industry we should be not only proud about, but we should be looking to accelerate our investment into over the coming decades.
[11:22 / 2030 – Transportation]
Let’s look at the year 2030, right? We’re at transportation. Are we driving an electric powered vehicle.
How many here, show of hands, who would buy an electric battery powered car? Well, odds are that that vehicle, the separator from it [the battery separator in a lithium ion battery] will be either developed or manufactured here in our state.
This year, big announcement from DuPont in Richmond, they’re putting a $20 million dollar nanofiber production facility for advanced lithium ion battery membranes in Richmond [Virginia].
Let’s think about – well, maybe we [humanity] never get to high powered batteries. Maybe we’re going to work with bio-fuels. Bio-fuels are very nasty. They are very inconsistent and they do a lot of bad things to an engine. So if you want to think about, “How do I protect that engine?” You’re going to have to do it with advanced filtration.
Even if you look at how bio-materials are processed to make a fuel, there are anywhere between five and thirty processing steps which involve the use of a technical textile. Again, those are materials all being developed and pioneered within an hour’s drive of where we’re all sitting.
[12:33 / 2040 – Health]
Let’s look out even further to 2040, to health. Everyone here familiar with stem cells? Show of hands?
So the question, is, what do I grow those stem cells on? Right, we don’t just release a stem cell and it magically knows where to go. If you want to regrow an organ, or if you want to grow a rotator cuff that has been torn, what you’re going to have to do is grow that material on something.
What will be that something? What will be that substrate? What will be that tissue scaffold?
At the nano-scale, in a life-science setting, a textile is currently your leading contender.
Let’s look at something else. How do high end pharmaceuticals get made?
When someone is making Tylenol, how do they make sure there are no impurities introduced during the manufacturing process? How do we make sure that the water is pure? How do we make sure we can make enough of it? We do that with industrial level processing, which is enabled through industrial [should be technical] textiles.
Any vision you have of the future where there are more personalized and tailored medicines, where there are new drugs and therapies that will extend the human life, textiles enable that vision.
[13:43 / 2050 – The Frontier]
So finally, let’s look out, I know we had earlier today someone speak about Aerospace, but let’s look [again] at the frontier. Can man live beyond earth? Can you get single-stage to orbit (“SSTO”)? The reason that people work with fiber glass – it is FIBER glass – is because of the structural strengthening of the materials. A number of the machine companies that move here to North Carolina, and a surprisingly number, err, high number of companies that come here to make use of our history in NASCAR and development of custom performance products, do so because of the high strength and high degree of reliability that those parts introduce.
If you want to make an advanced aerodynamic vehicle, if you want to make a carbon fiber jet, you’re more than likely going to be working with advanced textile production processes. When you think about what are things we can do to think real BIG – to move beyond Earth. Those capabilities will be made possible by an increased use of technical textiles.
[14:53]
To conclude – for a lot of year’s many of us have been apologists about our loss of jobs in what can be considered fashion. We’ve lost many jobs that can be considered cut and sew, or very basic, industries. What we’ve kept is a very important industry, in technical textiles, that should be at the forefront of how we look at growing our state, [that] should be at the forefront of how we look at growing entrepreneurship, and it should be something that we can sit back and take pride in as a State and as an organization.
Thank you.
Posted inBusiness, Innovation, Textile|Comments Off on TEDx Raleigh Transcript: Making Textiles Sexy
As part of moving the blog from iWeb to WordPress, I’ve moved over the most popular posts. This article deserved some additions. The original .pdf of the article is here.
What is a JA-Market?
JA is an acronym for “Just Another.” It is based on scenarios where; (i) a layperson is over-whelmed by the options, (ii) a regular practitioner observes that there are a finite set of options, many of which are difficult to tell apart, and finally (iii) that a seasoned practitioner can quickly show that the unique opportunities are highly valuable.
Restaurants and food are everyday examples of JA-problems. A neophyte walking the streets of Manhattan sees many options. However, it takes an expert who focuses on the issue to step back and see that there are a finite number of options, and that few of them are truly unique. If you find yourself in a JA-market, the most important objective is to become an expert as quickly as possible. Below we discuss methods for accelerating the development of that expertise.
A Case of the JA-‘s (pronounced “jah”)
It all started with JAMMBOG. At Parish Capital’s 2005 annual meeting we used the term “Just Another Mid-Market BuyOut Group” to describe a phenomena that we observed in private equity. Most buyout groups look similar. Mid-market buyout groups (those that buy companies with $50 mm – $250 MM in revenue) looked even more similar. I don’t think we coined JAMMBOG, but the term struck a chord. For those in asset management who were constantly scouting for new investment opportunities, JAMMBOG was a real problem – how do you tell these groups apart?
“Just Another” served as a pejorative preposition. Over four years we evaluated some 2,000 private equity opportunities – about 30% of which could have been labeled JAMMBOG. Meeting after meeting, call after call, these groups would sit across and try in vain to differentiate themselves from their peers. Differentiation was a tough assignment.
JAJAA (jah-jah) stands for Just Another “Just Another” Acronym. “JA-“ exists beyond the walls of the private equity industry. Since joining Elmarco to run US Sales and Marketing, I’ve been dealing with a pair of triplets; JANTI, JANFI and JANMI.
JANTI (jan-tee) is short for Just Another NanoTech Idea; JANFI (jan-fee) for Just Another NanoFiber Idea and JANMI (jan-mee) for Just Another NanoMaterial Idea. There should be one for Cleantech – suggestions are welcome. As a nanofiber equipment supplier, we see a great many ideas wrapped in nano. Like their distant brethren in private equity they are often difficult to differentiate. Where the private equity groups were all, “value-added, operationally-focused, bottom line driven and buying proprietary deal flow,” the JANTI triplets have, “easily scalable technology, high surface area, novel properties at market parity pricing.”
Over breakfast this morning with a local VC and fellow entrepreneur, we discussed that the RTP area here in NC was going through another JARAG phase. Just Another Regional Angel Group. Several are being formed, as there were in the late 1990’s and the early 2000’s. They are everywhere, difficult to tell apart and it is uncertain how long the will persist.
The same problem existed on our Committee on Forecasting Future Disruptive Technologies. There are many, many forecasts of “technologies-to-watch” or “big-trends-for-2050”. How does one sort through the JAFFO (Just Another Future FOrecast)?
The JA-Problem and Solutions
Is there a JAJAP? A Just Another Just Another Problem? A JA-problem?
The JAJAP only exists in the eyes of those who are evaluating a market. Those who are promoting JANTI, JANMI, JANFI or JAMMBOG concepts may not have a problem – they may even benefit from being part of the pack. In economics we see the ‘theory of minimum differentiation’ also known as Hotelling’s law, which explains why we always see McDonald’s and Burger King across the street from each other. If you’re in the pack, and the pack is a good place to be, then the rational player would avoid differentiation at all costs. Any player who emerged would be chased – like the leader of the Tour de France emerging from the peloton.
The JAJAP requires inspection to occur, along with a sufficient number of participants, and a lack of clear differentiation in the participants. Further, if the JA-players are following Hotelling’s law, then they are actively attempting to render any differentiation.
What should the evaluator do? What is best for the tech scout? Or the agent looking to allocate money?
The first goal is to list the facets of the objects that are of interest. By laying out the components of the object, we begin a process of understanding what the evaluator is looking for. Second, look to quantify the facets that are most important. In private equity – returns were an easy area to focus on. For the JANTI triplets, cost of the end material is usually a good proxy for market suitability and technology maturity.
Finally, in JA-problems, instead of looking for ‘winners’ it is often good protocol to quickly bin out the losers; in the same way a manufacturing operation puts defective parts in the ‘bad’ bin. When mediocrity is the norm, make a mediocre pile. The excellent options will stand out.
If you are a participant in a JA-market, the goal if you are mediocre is to ensure that the pack persists. If someone emerges – imitate them. If those making decisions about who to work with are confused – make sure the confusion persists. Fight industry standards. Hide behind secrecy. If you are a JA-participant with a solid product and leadership potential, the goal becomes breaking away from the pack.
Summary
For a JA-choice to exist, we would need:
At least N options, such that evaluation of N requires skill and time.
No master list of the options.
Incoherent or incomparable data on the options available.
Once a ranking can be assembled, it could be expected that the key variable or facet would show kurtosis; potentially a Cauchy distribution or power-law.
Posted inUncategorized|Comments Off on A Framework for JA-Markets
The original .pdf of this paper is here. The .pdf has several images and graphs that are not present here.
Introduction
This article was written to summarize and promote the concepts of Dr. Christopher Musso (bio is here [http://esd.mit.edu/people/alumni.html#musso]), as put forth in his 2005 dissertation, Beating the System: Accelerating Commercialization of New Materials which can be found here [http://esd.mit.edu/people/dissertations/musso.pdf]. A chapter-by-chapter synopsis is found at the closing of this document as Exhibit 1: Highlights from the Text.
Background
Contacts at three Fortune 100 materials companies recommended reading Beating the System: Accelerating Commercialization of New Materials, the February 2005 dissertation of Dr. Christopher Scott Musso. Having spent the past two years commercializing electrospinning, the dominant method for production of nanofibers, the recommendations all came in the context of marketing advanced materials. Since 2006 I’ve also been working on the Committee on Forecasting Future Disruptive Technologies overseen by the National Research Council. Many of Musso’s arguments are relevant to technology forecasting. The approach, tone and methodical nature are similar to that of Eric Von Hippel’s The Sources of Innovation.[1]
Musso has clear applications for anyone working in or around materials science or for those who are involved in technology forecasting. Studies of materials science have significant application to the Nano, Industrial, Cleantech or Energy (“NICE”) technology sectors.
Dr. Musso’s paper is valuable for three reasons; (i) it is quantitative – the author gives real numbers, backed by the source data wherever possible; (ii) it is evidence-based – Musso bases his work on decades of materials innovation in the plastics industry; (iii) it is focused exclusively on materials. This focus on materials is significant given the increased focus on NICE technologies. NICE technologies impact industries which are vastly different than information technology, which has been the dominant area of venture capital investment over the past three decades.
Materials Are Unique
These four points come verbatim from Musso’s text (page 17) and they are the clearest discussion of how materials are different from other industries.
1. “Materials come early in the value chain.” Early in the value chain means far away from retail customers. To win with materials, you’ll need to be comfortable with an industrial sales process, know how to navigate committee-style purchase processes and vet whether or not your prospects can transition into real customers. Dealing with industrial customers, rather than retail, dramatically shrinks the number of prospects – there aren’t hundreds of shots on goal, you’ll be lucky to have dozens.
2. “Materials are difficult to change.” “Iterate, iterate, iterate” is the mantra of web service start-ups. Such iteration for materials is expensive, time-consuming and often not possible. New materials have a diverse range of properties that are often notable only on an empirical basis, creating long discovery processes for management and customers alike.
3. “Materials are versatile.” A novel new material has many potential applications. Whereas an end product is designed for a specific market, a new material often has many applications and must instead be ruled out of new applications. The new material often finds its market by being ruled out from others, rather than being ruled in.
4. “Materials are functionally fungible.” If a material does the same job as another material, with outperformance along select dimensions, or with better cost; the old material will be usurped despite its service to the industry. There is little loyalty from a materials customer; better performance or cost will quickly drive replacement of an existing material.
Six Essential Factors for Materials and NICE Technologies
1. Insertion vs Penetration. Musso states clearly that materials face two challenges; insertion into an application, and subsequent penetration into an application. While the act of insertion echoes the themes of early adopters in Moore’s Chasm Model, it provides an important distinction for those working in this area. [2] Insertion is the act of getting someone to include a material in a new application. Penetration is the act of winning that application and becoming the material of choice. Musso provides numerous examples that the factors that make for easy insertion are different than those that make for long term penetration.
2. Materials framework: Enabler, Platform, Substitution. If we evaluate the difference between insertion and penetration, we can start to look at end market applications differently. Enabler markets are those that have a high speed of insertion, but which might not be the kind of robust markets needed for long term success. Examples are the Hula Hoop and highway reflectors, which provided certain plastics easy markets to enter which had not previously existed. Since the markets were new, and were enabled by the materials, they were easily won. Platform markets are the markets which allow a material to gain market transaction; they allow the material to scale, engineers to learn their capabilities and customers to accept their presence. It is only after the platform phase that substitution markets can be addressed – the material can pursue areas where they have superior cost or performance to existing materials.
3. Serendipity’s Demotion. When working with a new material there are frequent discussions about the ideal market. These discussions usually include faith in serendipity; that the ideal application or market lurks around the corner, and that rather than focusing on execution, time should be spent on additional application development. Musso’s research shows that the likelihood of finding the lucky market is low. For 34 plastics in application, only 1 was to find its largest market in an area that had not been previously considered. The largest markets for 33 of 34 new materials were identified in the early days of the materials’ development. As a corollary, enablers were important, and only 2 plastics of 34 were immediately inserted into the markets that would go on to be their largest application. There is always a fear with a new material that there must be relentless innovation to create options to enter previously unidentified new markets; this is wasted time. Given a large range of experts evaluating potential markets, it is likely the best markets for the material have already been identified.
4. The 20 Year Rule. Common materials wisdom states that it takes 20 years for a new material to reach widespread adoption. Rather than challenge this rule, Musso took it as a given and looked for ways to shorten this time period. He broke out delaying concerns by whether or not they were technical concerns or supply chain challenges. Technical challenges were more significant, causing a delay of 11 years, three times longer than the typical supply chain delay of 3.7 years.
5. Cost Doesn’t Matter. Musso found that when looking at insertion factors, what mattered was that the cost must be feasible, not necessarily cheaper. For the 34 plastics that entered a new market, “81.25% were equal to or higher [the cost of the material they replaced].” (Chapter 4, pg. 71).
6. Importance of Community. Community, often touted as the core to new IT products, was equally, if not more important, to the materials science community. Musso saw this area being driven by transaction costs. Community creates credibility around the material, reduces the fear of failure for an engineer working with a material, reduces learning costs, and per Musso, “The goal of all insertion strategies is to minimize the switching costs faced by manufacturers who are potential adopters of a material.”
Finding Enabler Markets
If you are working with a new material or NICE technology, Enabler markets are key. They keep your business alive, allow you to demonstrate your capabilities, create time to address production concerns, and as noted allow the community of customers to learn about your capabilities. In Chapter 6, Musso notes six key characteristics of an Enabler end application.
1. “[The new] Material offers unique value.” An enabler market currently has an unmet need; the problem is currently not fixable. In this scenario, any solution, regardless of its inexperience or cost, has a chance. This is the defining element of an enabler market.
2. “Simple value chains.” Enabler markets sit closer to the end customer than most materials supply chains; they have a simple path to execution. The industrial customer may be vertically integrated, or the supply chain may be simple. They allow the value of the new material to be quickly captured and production issues smoothed over.
3. “Develop the materials value chain = Learning.” Customers in the Enabler market want and need the new material; they have a history of pushing the envelope and are not easily scared away. Hiccups that would derail a more hesitant customer are surmounted, because the Enabler customer places a value on the learning process. This has the further balance of encouraging transparency from the new material organization.
4. “Fault tolerant applications.” The enabler market has a lower penalty for failure than a conventional materials application. Risks of lawsuit, death, explosions or massive product recalls are low.
5. “Visible to adjacent, attractive markets.” The new material’s accomplishments in the enabler market must be readily observable and transferable to the larger platform and substitution markets that the new material will eventually target.
6. “Must be profitable for the application manufacturer.” Enabler customers aren’t charities – they may have higher margins made possible from the new material than any other potential application. Indeed, it is their ability to exploit a previously unexplored application made possible by this new application that allows them to be an early adopter of the new material.
VC and Materials: Not an Ideal Combination
Early on in the document, Dr. Musso lays out some of the basic reasons that VC investing in materials (and therefore the NICE technologies) is unlikely to be significant or attractive.[3] Musso’s basis for this assertion is that the relative returns are simply too high and that the initial capital outlay, estimated to be $10,000,000 or more, is also too great. While I agree that the constraints around capital are legitimate, having surveyed many early stage investors, there appear to be other contributing factors as to why a VC partnership might not be suited towards this market.
Most VC firms are oriented towards the end market applications they service. Over the past decade, many VCs have developed expertise around retail software applications, often known as web applications. Other firms have shown expertise around telecommunications, pharmaceuticals and the electronics industry. Across most firms, domain expertise has been the most common point of differentiation; this allows for more opportunities to make money in an industry and easier marketing to those Limited Partners who invest in VC funds.
As we’ve seen earlier in this market, success in materials investing is based on finding success in Enabler industries, which are difficult to identify. If Enabler markets are diverse, ill-defined and often exist only conceptually, then it would be difficult for any set of partners, let alone a VC fund in pursuit of 10 year returns, to identify them and make a business of finding them.
Despite these concerns, constructing a team to focus on these markets could create attractive return possibilities. Teams with similar target investment market and operational challenges exist in the pharmaceutical and life sciences industries. Whereas many VC groups are loosely knit confederations of readily available individuals, constructing an investment team for this market would require a long term commitment and focus on assembling a uniquely pedigreed team.
Unlikely to Disrupt
Musso references the work of Clayton Christensen, author of The Innovator’s Dilemma on disruptive technologies several times. Musso states that disruptive technologies are those that move through the supply chain quickly and find Enabler markets the most rapidly.
For those materials that don’t quickly fall into their enabler market, or in which the enabler market has minimal societal impact, it is unlikely that they will be considered disruptive; these slow developing materials take too long and lack the surprise that is so common with disruption. As we look back to the key challenges to materials innovation, they are unlikely to cause disruption, as they must be broadcast widely, take long times to adopt and require a good deal of learning costs before they become widespread.
Closing Thoughts
There is much in the popular press about NICE investing and entrepreneurial focus in this space. Many heading into the area are new to materials, industrial sales and hard technology engineering. These industries are vastly different than the IT industry which has been the primary focus for entrepreneurship over the past decade. We see with Musso’s work that the materials industry is different than would be expected from the industry’s own conventional marketing wisdom. Applying Musso’s dissertation to product innovation in materials science could have significant impact on operators and investors alike.
Next Steps: Read the Source Document
While putting together this synopsis has been helpful in clarifying my own learnings from Musso’s document, it is no substitute for the actual paper. I highly recommend reading the source material and hope that he has opportunities to expand upon the concepts he has outlined. It is my hope that documents like Beating the System: Accelerating Commercialization of New Materials and this synopsis will help to standardize product commercialization steps for NICE technologies in much the same fashion that the IT development and web application industries have codified their product and marketing methods.
Exhibit 1: Highlights from the Text
The following notes are a synopsis of the work of Dr. Christopher Musso.
Beating the System: Accelerating Commercialization of New MaterialsBy Christopher Scott Musso
Submitted to the Engineering Systems Division in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Technology, Management, and Policy at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
February 2005
Chapters and Highlights
1. Beating the System (pg. 15)
1.1. Materials industry is a very broad classification.
1.2. Definitions of a material = “Anything for which an engineering drawing does not exist” to “The substance or substances out of which a thing is or can be made.”
1.3. Unique aspects of materials
1. Materials come early in the value chain
2. Materials are difficult to change
3. Materials are versatile
4. Materials are functionally fungible
1.4. Market pull (other markets) vs technology push (materials)
2. Review and Commentary of Relevant Literature on Materials (pg. 25)
2.1. Risk factors – “Time to market risk”
1. The 20 year challenge
2. VC analysis (page 28)
2.2. Traditional materials marketing wisdom
1. Large initial markets
2. Substitution based on superior value
3. Special focus on lower costs
2.2.3.1. Great graphic of production volume vs cost for all materials (pg 31):
Figure 2.1: Graph of production volume v. cost. Note that this graph does not take into account the relative density of materials.
4. Investment Methodology for Materials (“IMM”) page 32
2.3. Obstacles to Commercialization
1. Production / technical obstacles
2.3.1.1. Appropriability
2.3.1.2. Production capacity
2.3.1.3. Market identification
2. Value chain obstacles
2.4. Applicable General Innovation Theories
1. Schumpeter – Dominant Design, 1943 – page 38
2. Christensen – Disruptive Technology
3. The Pattern of Materials Commercialization (pg. 45)
3.1. Materials industries do not follow conventional life cycles “Iterative cycles are very difficult to develop” – pg. 45
3.2. Traditional wisdom holds that placement = penetration
3.3. Musso bifurcates insertion and penetration
3.4. Plastics industry survey
3.5. Expectations if ‘common’ wisdom were correct
1. Largest markets came quickly after initial development
3.5.1.1. Page 53 histogram
3.5.1.2. 8.5 year mean, 8.2 year standard deviation
2. Earliest applications became very large (corollary of above)
3.5.2.1. First only 2/34 times
3.5.2.2. Only 1/3 of the materials made it into biggest market in < 3 years
3. Negative correlation between insertion time and market size
3.6. Enabler phase and concept
1. Material solved a problem, it made possible something previously impossible
5. Killer app, builds credibility, gets the wrinkles out, a good early customer
3.7. Platform phase = key to commercial success
3.8. Widespread substitution
3.9. Page 69 graphic
1. Enabler = 0 – 3 years, Platform = 2 – 7 years, Widespread substitution = 3 – 25years
3.10.Comparison to Kurzweil
4. Insertion Factors (pg. 71)
4.1. Possible reasons for lag between availability and biggest application
1. Serendipity in identification
4.1.1.1. Not so; only the case in 1/34 – polystyrene cassette tapes
4.1.1.2. “The major plastics were proposed as potential suitors for all of the biggest applications earlier than they were inserted into those applications.”
4.1.1.3. 4.6 year gap between identification and insertion, 82% identified very early
2. Cost of material
4.1.2.1. “81.25% were equal to or higher”
4.1.2.2. Focus on a feasible price, not a superior price
4.1.2.3. Pg. 78 histogram
3. Technically incapable
4.1.3.1. Solved with science and R&D rather than empirical (value chain)
4.1.3.2. 11 year delay, 3x greater than value chain alone
4.1.3.3. Serve as a barrier for addressing other issues
4. Value chain issues
4.1.4.1. 3.7 year delay
4.1.4.2. Page 81 histogram
4.2. Disagrees with Christensen
1. Both ignore that there is a firm in the middle
5. The Effects of Value Chain Complexity (pg. 101)
5.1. Major impact is time and conceals the real problems
5.2. Number of parts vs insertion time (page 112)
5.3. Contributing factors
1. Complexity
2. Swtiching costs < Unknown switching costs
5.3.2.1. Unknown
5.3.2.2. Multiple
5.3.2.3. Hand-off
6. Towards Faster Commercialization of New Materials (pg. 135)
6.1. “Players in the application value chain rarely have the equipment or knowledge necessary to fully utilize their potential.”
6.2. Value chain complexity
1. Pg. 138 2 x 2 grid
2. Levers
6.2.2.1. Market selection
6.2.2.2. Integration
6.2.2.3. Technical development
6.3. Field learning, “was sometimes the only practical way to succeed.” – pg. 144 von Hippel
6.4. “The ensuring problem is easy to see: How can producers get validation customers to absorb large learning, liability, and handoff costs for unproven materials so that networks can begin?” The answer is simple: materials producers should carefully choose application markets that are minimally sensitive to these costs, and should integrate forward when those markets are not available.”
6.5. 2 x 2 grid – Insertion strategies on page 152
6.6. Selecting enabler applications
1. Material offers unique value
2. Simple value chains
3. Develop the materials value chain = Learning
4. Fault tolerant applications
5. Visible to adjacent, attractive markets
6. Must be profitable for the application manufacturer
6.7. “One job poorly done counteract(ed) twenty jobs well done”
7. Lessons in Competition (Penetration Factors) (pg. 165)
7.1. Technical compatability does not alone create a defensible position
7.2. Value chain can be an obstacle but also a defensive capability
1. Standards and design
2. Track record
3. Understanding and learning
4. 2 x 2 grid – Insertion strategy map on page 179 (Same as previous)
7.3. Safest position; be the lowest cost material – lowest common denominator
8. Walking Through the Shadow of the Valley of Death (pg. 181)
8.1. “The goal of all insertion strategies is to minimize the switching costs faced by manufacturers who are potential adopters of a material.”
[2] Moore, Geoffrey A. Crossing the Chasm: Marketing and Selling Disruptive Products to Mainstream Customers (2002). (Blog post review)
[3] Dr. Musso makes one mistake when accounting for the portfolio effect in VC returns. He notes that a VC would need to make four investments to get one liquidity event and mistakenly multiples the rate of return by 4, rather than the exit amount. This leads to his ~1,000,000x target exit multiple, whereas a ~400x would suffice. Both are high, much higher than any admitted target exit multiple of even aggressive VCs.
While there are a number of books, articles and case studies that dwell on the investment criteria and portfolio companies of private equity funds, few deal with the challenges of running a firm. For the purposes of this writing, private equity (“PE”) takes on the classical definition of any non-public equity investment; this includes venture capital, buyout, as well as other illiquid alternative investments. In this document we outline the primary operating functions of a private equity partnership and use that as a template to map operational improvements. Our focus in this document is on operational activities, and while there are clear implications for investment strategy, we take that as a given in our examples and leave it for future discussion.
Objectives of Private Equity Operations
In the public markets we encounter a wide variety of rules and regulations that define the acceptable set of behaviors for an investor. It is through following these rules and regulations that a firm is able to become publicly traded; in exchange for conforming to these rules operating firms are able to access broad capital markets with minimal transaction costs. Private equity markets are the opposite. While many laws apply, there is much more flexibility in their application and interpretation. The goal for a private equity firm is to maximize the impact of this flexibility to create investment advantages for their investors. The public equity investment is constrained by the legal environment which enables its existence; absent these constraints the private equity investor has a much greater degree of flexibility and a much larger ability to differentiate its investment operations from its public equity cohorts.
Directionality – Upstream / Downstream
Private equity firms serve as market makers between their investors (often referred to as limited partners or “LPs”) and operating companies looking for investors. If we evaluate the activities based on the flow of funds, the LPs are “upstream” of the PE organization, and the operating firms are downstream. The activities of the PE firm when pursuing LP investors mirror those of the operating firm when pursuing the PE firm; in this observation we note symmetry in the performance of activities. For any activities performed by a PE firm, we can assume that they are performed both in pursuit of investments and in pursuit of investors.
Investment Process Activities
We outline five phases of the investment process;
1. Sourcing. Sourcing is the act of identifying and pursuing investment opportunities. The actual investments, and resulting portfolio, emerge as a subset of the prospects evaluated during deal sourcing.
2. Diligence. Diligence is the act of evaluating an investment opportunity. Only well qualified deals will pass through diligence and into deal structuring.
3. Deal structuring. Deal structuring is the combined act of negotiating, creating legal documentation and closing of a transaction. While deal structures have numerous conventions; the fact that private equity transactions are in fact private, negotiated deals provides substantial variation in the way they are closed. Differences in legal conventions between agents, lawyers and accountants create great influence in deal execution as well.
4. Operations. During the Operations phase the investment is managed following the closing of the transaction. The methods of exerting influence are identified during the deal structuring phase, and may include fees, board positions, preferred returns, pre-identified rules, advisory boards, etc. The operations phase can be the longest and most involved phase of the investment process, and this ability for differentiation in activity is definitionally absent in public equity investments. Of the five investment phases outlined here, operations is the most interesting for future decomposition and analysis.
5. Exit. Exit is the act of selling the investment and bringing the relationship to a close. In the public markets it is a rare case where an investor can create an advantage in the way they exit a holding; in the private markets the timing, method, structure and even the purchasing party are all variables which impact the value of the investors’ returns.
Operational Template
When we combine the directionality of investment activities (upstream and downstream) with the five investment process activities, we find a 2 x 5 grid which allows us to analyze the discrete functional areas of a PE firm. By laying out the capabilities, we can (i) conduct orderly diligence of their capabilities, (ii) create side by side analysis between firms, and (iii) look for ways to improve the operations of a firm. The grid below is a rough outline; further materials are available upon request.
Downstream
Upstream
Sourcing
Targeting of investments
Promotion of the PE firm in target markets
Trade show attendance
Networking
Talks, etc.
Identification of potential LPs
Pursuit of LPs
Meetings
Research
Diligence
Technical
Legal
Market
Technical
Legal
Diligence kit
Deal Structuring
Unique advantages
(Financial structures, etc.)
Knowing the market
Cornerstone
Anticipating change
Operations
Adding value post deal
Common methods
Use of operating partners
Customer service
LP Reporting
Annual meetings
Exit
Multiple / EBITDA growth
Recycling
Speed
Strategic Implications
The strategy of a PE firm is dictated by its assets under management, the transaction pipeline and the expertise of its operators. Given two firms with the same strategy, a relative ranking across the 2 x 5 grid will demonstrate areas where the firms could be expected to have differentiated performance.
Conclusions
Private equity firms are small, rare and highly differentiated. Understanding the activities of a firm with fewer than 20 employees, of which there are fewer than 2,000 in the US, and which invest in dramatically different types of businesses makes comparison between firms difficult. Our 2 x 5 operational template provides a first attempt to decompose, define and codify the activities that go on within these firms. We believe it will serve as an important first step in improving LP diligence as well as GP investment performance.
Posted inUncategorized|Comments Off on Operational Framework for Private Equity and Venture Capital
The use of simulations to model behavior has increased in popularity; with increased computing power and software capabilities simulations have been able to replicate complex real-world behaviors. For a thorough text on the subject, see Philip Ball’s Critical Mass: How One Thing Leads to Another. Two simulations using cellular automata, also known as intelligent agents, which are frequently referenced are the sandpile game and the forest fire game. Based on the behavior of the agents in this work; we set forth a game which would allow for basic modeling of industry and firm behavior by following a similar game.
In the Grazing Game, we take the view that there are three key elements; (i) the field, or game board, (ii) resources, allocated across the field that vary over time, and, (iii) the players, which make decisions about where they would like to be on the field based on their own capabilities and the status of the resources. At each step of the game, players evaluate the field using their attributes to detect resources, move accordingly based on their attributes and then come to rest. Players seek to achieve some target value of Karma in their moves. We outline several methods by which the game can be made more complex and also look at how the results could be used to evaluate industry and firm competitive behavior.
Description
The game board, consisting of adjacent areas. The field is the location upon which resources are allocated and the positions that players desire to achieve.
Resources are allocated to the field. The number of resources can vary, as well as their individual characteristics.
Players seek to attain positions on the field which will give them a certain relative value. The players have different abilities (ie resource perception and movement) and may pursue different resources.
Facets in Iteration 1 of the Game
A simple grid
Field has no boundaries (ie spherical surface)
Locations may have limited carrying capacity
Single resource
Random log normal distribution
Resource changes in distribution after each play
Ability to perceive resources (distance)
Steps to move in a single turn
Facets in Iteration 2 of the Game
Rather than simple grid, locations have a range of connections
Create artificial boundaries
Multiple resources
Resources may have force-multiplier effects
Resources may shift at different rates
Different attractions to different resources
Facets in Iteration 3 of the Game
Locations may have long distance ties to far parts of the board (travel)
Resources may have combinatorial values (derivatives)
Resources may have greater ability to attract players (publicity)
False and/or negative resources
Ability to understand derivatives
Ability to communicate between players
Players may have no ability to determine resources; may simply mimic nearby players
Karma calculations may change over time
Rounds
The players will move (or attempt to move) each turn. The game will be played for thousands of turns; allowing Karma calculations at the end of each turn. By varying the characteristics of the field, resources and the players, we will be able to interpret which methods maximize player Karma. As we vary the game characteristics over time, we will find better analogs to competitive landscapes faced in industries, allowing for simulation of strategies. By overlaying this with the different characteristics found in players, and eventually in communities of players, we will be able to see what strategies maximize player performance and Karma.
Constituents
1.The field
Assume a geometrically uniform area (ie a square) or playing field. There are no end or corner locations (imagine playing on the surface of a sphere).
Entrants (players) are deposited at random on the map in a log normal fashion. (X = # of entrants / Y = # of locations with that many entrants is log normal)
New entrants enter in a log normal fashion based on the presence of existing participants
Spots on the map have a relative value (values could be of anything, imagine ‘goodness’ or the amount of a desired resource.) (Such that; X = # of locations with a given value of goodness / Y = Amount of Goodness = log normal)
There is a change in goodness value at a location over a time period. (This change is bi-directional, such that it moves up and down. Such that X = % of locations that experience a given level of change and Y = % of change in a given time period.)
Amount of time that goodness persists at a location (Such that if we were to evaluate the duration that a spot were to hold the ‘Max Goodness Value’ title, X = duration of time that a max holder held that title and Y = number of max holders with that duration of time)
2.The Players
Entrants attempt to pursue geographies of high value (again, assume the values are measures of goodness).
Entrants are capable of perceiving goodness (Such that; X = an entrants ability to perceive goodness and Y = number of entrants with that given amount of capability)
Ability to perceive goodness of a specific location is the function of distance to the location, this too is log normal
Entrants’ desire to pursue goodness follows a log normal distribution (Such that X = % of entrants that have a desire to move and Y = % of entrants that have a given desire level)
This too changes over time in a bi-directional log normal fashion
Speed of pursuit follows a log normal distribution. (Such that X = % of entrants able to move at a given speed and Y = speed at which entrants can move)
3.Play of the Game
FIRST TURN
Populate board with initial values
Populate board with initial players
Allow players to calculate
Allow players to move
SECOND TURN
Calculate players relative happiness value
Happiness = F (Desire, [Value*Target – Value*Current])
Calculate Happiness of the entire board, SUM (ALL PLAYERS)
Recalculate board values
Allow players to calculate
Allow players to move
N TURNS
Calculate players relative happiness values
Repeat (ii) – (iv) above
4.Objectives
Measure changes in aggregate happiness over time
Are their trends?
Measure changes in aggregate happiness under different values of the variables
Do some variables have a greater impact?
5.Other modifications
Introduce carnivores that want to be where the herbivores are
Introduce herding or flocking behavior
Introduce types of geographic value (again, Lognormal distribution) and different kinds of consumers (LND here, too).
Introduce Communication between geographies and between players
Players may desire to be near each other or far away from each other (bi-directional)
Meta-geographic values – ability for some geographies to support multiple sub-categories at certain times
Introduce race to the players
Introduce coordination among the players
Evaluating Long Term Results
How often and how far are players moving?
How much stability is there? Over 500, 1 000, 10 000 moves?
What variables influence performance the most? Do any of them matter?
What variables change the play of the game?
If we introduce different rules to the agents, what improves performance? If we put the agents through an evolutionary process, culling weak players at random, which strategies
Posted inUncategorized|Comments Off on The Grazing Game: A Framework for Industry and Firm Behavior
This document was originally composed as part of the Carolina Venture Fellows program in 2004. It was also used by Parish Capital in some of our early marketing materials.
Introduction:
The universe of emerging manager private equity fund-of-funds is both small and relatively young. Swensenís Pioneering Portfolio Management, often considered the modern guidebook to practical institutional asset management, makes short comment on private equity as part of alternative assets as a class, has limited discussion of the role of a fund-of-funds, and the only discussion of emerging is in regards to developing economies.1 While the role of an emerging manager private equity fund-of-fund, its manager selection process, and observations about private equity style are all of significant interest and could fill several volumes with their nuances, this paper will focus on basic elements of this market. The author will look at existing definitions of emerging managers, discuss their potential for superior returns and conclude with rationales for institutional investors to pursue them as an asset class using a fund-of-funds.
You must be logged in to post a comment.